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Regulation of the Internet:
The Application of Established
Constitutional Law to Dangerous
Electronic Communication
BY ADAM R. KEGLEY*
INTRODUCTION
T he purpose of this Note is not to address generally the recent
attempts to regulate the Internet. The current legal literature is
replete with articles concerning nearly all aspects of the Internet and other
computer-related legal issues: general First Amendment discussion;'
personal jursdiction;2 domestic regulation;3 international regulation;4
on-line liability;5 "cashless commerce;" 6 discovery;7 libel;' theft of
*J.D. expected 1998, Umversity of Kentucky.
'See Norman Redlich & David R. Lune, First Amendment Issues
Presented by the "Information Superhighway, " 25 SETON HALL L. REv 1446
(1995).
2 See Richard S. Zembek, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet:
Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Sm.
& TECH. 339 (1996).
' See Ilene Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the Global
Information Superhighway: A Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARV J.L. & TECH.
275 (1995).
" See Amy Knoll, Comment, Any Which Way But Loose: Nations Regulate
the Internet, 4 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP L. 275 (1996).
' See Marc L. Caden & Stephanie E. Lucas, Comment, Accidents on the
Information Superhighway: On-line Liability and Regulation, 2 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 3 (Feb. 13, 1996) <http://www.unch.edu/-joltv2:l/cadenlucas.html>
6 See Catherine M. Downey, Comment, The High Price of a Cashless
Society: Exchanging Privacy Rights for Digital Cash?, 14 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFo. L. 303 (1996).
' See Ronald L. Plesser & Emilio W Cividanes, Discovery and Other
Problems Related to Electronically Stored Data and Privacy, 415 PLUPAT 277
(1995).
s See Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibel: A First Amendment
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computer files;9 employer access to employee e-mail;'0 encryption and
privacy;" marketing of pornography on the Internet; 2 and the battle
surrounding the Communications Decency Act. 3 Rather, this Note seeks
Limit for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arsing From Computer Bulletin Board
Speech, 46 CASE W RES. L. REv 235 (1995).
' See Todd H. Flaming, Comment, The National Stolen Property Act and
Computer Files: A New Form of Property, A New Form of Theft, 1993 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 255.
" See Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-Mail! Employee E-Mail
Monitoring and Privacy Law in the Age of the "Electronic Sweatshop, " 28 J.
MARSHALL L. REv 139 (1994); Julia Turner Baumhart, The Employer's Right
to Read Employee E-mail: Protecting Property or Personal Prying?, 8 LAB.
LAW 923 (1992) (student-written work).
" See Susan Frelwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After
the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv 949 (1996); Anjali Singhal, The
Piracy of Pnvacy 2 A Fourth Amendment Analysis of Key Escrow Cryptography,
7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv 189 (1996); Raphael Wimck, Searches and Seizures
of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV J.L. & TECH. 75 (1994); Clemens
P Work, Whose Privacy?, 55 MONT. L. REv 209 (1994); Panel III: The Privacy
Debate: To What Extent Should Traditionally "Private "Communications Remain
Private on the Internet?, 5 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 329
(1995) (one of several pieces m Symposium, First Amendment and the Media:
Regulating Interactive Communications on the Information Superhighway, 5
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 235 (1995)); Howard S. Dakoff,
Note, The Clipper Chip Proposal: Deciphering the Unfounded Fears That Are
Wrongfully Derailing Its Implementation, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv 475 (1996);
Nicole Giallonardo, Note, Steve Jackson Games v United States Secret Service:
The Government's Unauthorized Seizure of Private E-mail Warrants More Than
the Fifth Circuit's Slap on the Wrist, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
179 (1995); Timothy B. Lennon, Comment, The Fourth Amendment's Prohibi-
tions on Encryption Limitation: Will 1995 Be Like 1984?, 58 ALB. L. REV 467
(1994); George P Long, III, Comment, Who Are You?" Identity and Anonymity
in Cyberspace, 55 U. PiTT. L. REv 1177 (1994); Christopher E. Torkelson,
Comment, The Clipper Chip: How Key Escrow Threatens to Undermine The
Fourth Amendment, 25 SETON HALL L. REv 1142 (1995).
2 See Marty Rmum, MarketingPornography on the Information Superhigh-
way: A Survey of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stones and Animations
Downloaded 8.5 Million Times By Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty
Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849 (1995).
13 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
133; see also Electromc Frontier Foundation Homepage (visited Mar. 1, 1997)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Censorslup/HTML/hot.html> (includes the latest
information on debates between scholars and the current status of the Commum-
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generally to address the issue of dangerous or violent speech on the
Internet. Specifically, the Note argues that established case law on the
constitutional protection of speech applies to proposals to crummalize the
publication of bomb-making information on the Internet.
Part I of the Note'4 examines the characteristics of the Internet itself,
with an emphasis on those characteristics that have been identified as
being essential to the assertion that the Internet is a revolutionary
communications medium. Part fl' 5 considers Brandenburg v. Ohio,16
United States v. Progressive, Inc.,'7 and Rice v. Paladin Enterprises,
Inc.'" for their treatment of the constitutional implications of attempts
to restrict speech or impose liability for dangerous or violent speech. Part
IH19 examines an amendment to the Umted States Code proposed by
Senator Dianne Femstem that would have criminalized the teaching of
bomb-making techiques and the subcommittee testimony preceding its
adoption by the Senate. The Note seeks to demonstrate that the very
existence of this amendment was a response to a perceived threat that m
fact does not exist. Part IV20 questions Cass Sunstem's assertion that
"[w]hen messages advocating murderous violence flow to large numbers
of people, the calculus changes."'" This Note concludes that the Internet
is not fundamentally unlike other mass media and that existing laws
addressing the publication of bomb-making materials are readily
applicable to the evolving medium.
cations Decency Act).
"' See infra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
's See infra notes 44-84 and accompanying text.
,6 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
,7 United States v Progressive, Inc., 467 F Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
18 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996).
'9 See infra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 107-34 and accompanying text.
21 Cass R. Sunstem, Is Violent Speech a Right?, 22 Am. PROSPECT 34, 36
(1995). This question has been proposed in various formulations, such as:
"Suppose a terrorist posts on the Internet instructions on how to make out of
common household materials a bomb that is sufficiently powerful to destroy a
large building. Can this be prohibited?" GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1170 (3d ed. 1996) (Sunstem is a co-author). Sunstem recognizes
that, through the Internet, people may find large audiences for speech advocating
murderous violence. He then asserts that this increased potential mass audience
might justify a stricter application of existing law, or creation of new law, to
proscribe messages "advocating the illegal use of force to kill people." Sunsteln,
supra at 36.
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I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNET AND
THE DIFFERING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE MEDIUM
Physically, the Internet is nothing more than a network of computer
networks.22 It was created in 1969 as a Department of Defense expen-
ment designed to maintain stable networked links between computers in
the event of a nuclear attack.23 Individual computers are linked together
through telephone lines and they communicate via modems. Within this
network, some computers are those of individual users; other computers
function as servers, or high-capacity computers that store larger bundles
of information. Servers are maintained by individuals, companies, and
institutions. Internet service providers lease dedicated phone lines from
companies that in turn lease lines from telecommunications carners. Thus,
when a user connects to the Internet, his or her call is made directly to
an Internet service provider that maintains a server that is connected to
other servers through telephone lines linked and routed by a series of
switches.24 The result is that an individual can obtain Internet access for
a nominal monthly fee, or without charge through services provided by
many universities, that will enable him or her to communicate quickly
and efficiently with other computers around the world.
The typical services to which Internet users have access include e-
mail,25 newsgroups, 26 chat rooms,27 and homepages.2 These services
22 See John S. Zanghi, "Community Standards" in Cyberspace, 21 U.
DAYTON L. REv 95, 106 (1995) (citing EDWARD A. CAvAzos & GAVINO
MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW" YOUR RIGHTS AND DuTIEs IN THE ON-
LINE WORLD 1 (1994)).
23 See Knoll, supra note 4, at 276 (citing ED KROL, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE
TO THE INTERNET 11-18 (1995)).
24 For a more complete, yet basic, discussion, see BiLL GATES, THE ROAD
AHEAD 91-111 (1995).
25 E-mail is an electronic mailbox with a unique address for each user that
is stored on a service provider's mail server. See BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER,
NETSCAPE NAVIGATOR 2.0: SURFING THE WEB AND EXPLORING THE INTERNET
277 (1996).
26 Newsgroups are sites of discussion on a variety of subjects. Users
contribute messages to particular newsgroups for all other subscribers to read.
There are over 15,000 different newsgroups. See id. at 345.
27 Chatrooms are similar to newsgroups except that users communicate
through real time messages. See id. at 305.
28 A homepage is a World Wide Web document that is a home for a certain
type of information. Individuals, corporations, and schools, among other entities,
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have become well-known, even to those who have never used the
Internet, and share basic attributes that are relevant to the scope of this
Note. Essentially, such services allow individuals or groups to commum-
cate with other individuals or groups without the restrictions of geograph-
ical boundaries, postage, long-distance charges, or editorial intervention.
Putting physical and techmcal differences between these services aside,
they all generally allow Internet users to transmit letters, books, or "real-
time" messages to other users with relative anonymity Basically, this
commumcation is nothing more than the reading of written words on a
computer screen with no physical contact. The process is similar to
posting a message, with sound and still or moving pictures, on thousands
of bulletin boards around the world, possibly for no one or for millions
of people to read. Similarly, individuals now have the ability to send
thousands of messages to thousands of addresses culled from an
enormous address book. Alternatively, one may leave his or her
ramblings posted at just one location waiting to be discovered by
whomever happens to stumble upon the message.
Mike Goodwin29 has said there are three important characteristics
that make the Internet unique: (1) it is possible to achieve "many-to-many
commumcation;"3 (2) it is possible to reach large audiences at very low
cost;3 and (3) it is "possible to reach your audience without editorial
intermediation. 3 2 Goodwin asserts that the Internet is the first mass
medium to combine the experience of a private telephone call with the
scope of broadcast or print media.33 The implications of such assertions
are unclear except to illustrate the fact that, through the Internet, one
person may reach apotential audience of millions without the investment
of capital required of a broadcast company or a publisher. However, the
word potential cannot be emphasized strongly enough; although one may
"publish" a work on the Internet without expense, that work must still be
"discovered" by a reader. It is possible that publication may go complete-
maintain homepages to display a wealth of information. See id. at 22.
29 Mike Goodwin is general counsel for the Electroic Frontier Foundation,
a Califorma-based group dedicated to the promotion of civil liberties in
cyberspace. Its homepage is located at <http://www.eff.org> (visited Mar. 1,
1997).
30 Internet Symposium: LegalPotholes Alongthe Information Superhighway,
16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 541, 550 (1996) (transcript of panel comments from
symposium on new media law at Loyola Law School, Apr. 11, 1996).
3 See id.
32 Id. at 551.
33 See Id. at 550.
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ly unnoticed because, as Goodwin indicates, the Internet is not intrusive
in the same manner as television or radio. Communication on the Internet
does not just pour forth from a user's screen, rather "[t]he choices of
content are user-driven, in fact it is the most user-driven technology
since the book."'34
The Internet has evolved to the point where it has become a
sprawling and arguably boundless communications medium, limited only
by access to a computer and a telephone line. Currently, approximately
eighteen million Americans and Canadians have access to the Internet.35
In April 1995, it was estimated that the then-current forty million
worldwide users of the Internet would reach over two hundred million by
1999 36 As the total number of users has continued to increase at a
phenomenal rate, the Internet itself has steadily grown at a comparable
pace. In July 1995, it was estimated that "the Web is growing about 50
percent a month, with the number of Web sites doubling every 53
days."' The accuracy of such figures is unreliable because of the
Internet's explosive growth and the decentralized nature of the medium.
In fact, companies attempting to gather this information have created a
ruche market for themselves.38 Nevertheless, when considered merely for
illustrative purposes, these figures support the assertion that the Internet
has become, and will continue to be, a pervasive medium.
The growth of the Internet has precipitated extreme reactions, based
primarily upon different conceptualizations of the medium itself. The
Internet is perceived by nearly everyone as a medium with the potential
to change fundamentally the way we provide education and entertain-
ment, conduct business, and communicate among ourselves. For some,
these opportunities are viewed as being positive: helping to create a
better-educated population, a thriving industry of online commercial
transactions, and the breakdown of racial and ethnic distinctions.39
34 Id. at 555.
3S See Laurie Berger, Malang Money on the Internet: How to Succeed in
Cyberbusiness, NET, July 1996, at 44, 45.
36 See CNET Online, The Future of the Net (visited Nov. 3, 1996) <http:ll
www.cnet.com/Content/Features/Dlife/Future/Stats/Related/rs.ssll.html>
37 Id.
38 For example, one such company, International Data Corporation,
advertises itself to be "the world's leading provider of information technology
data, analysis, and consulting." International Data Corporation (visited Nov. 3,
1996) <http://www.idcresearch.com>
39 In a speech given on September 21, 1995, President Clinton stated:
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While these goals are laudable, other people fear that such promise
will not be realized without a cost. The Internet is also perceived as a
vehicle conducive to the wide-spread promotion of child pornography,
fraud, copyright infringement, gambling, and other crimes. The fact that
the Internet is so pervasive, decentralized, and unregulated is sometimes
seen as a threat that should be curtailed. For instance:
On April 27th [1995] the US Congress held a hearing on terrorism m
the wake of the bomb that killed 167 people in a federal building in
Oklahoma. Senator Edward Kennedy waved a 76-page "Terrorist's
Handbook" that his staff had downloaded from the Internet, and
explained that it contained instructions for building different types of
bombs, including the ammomum nitrate bomb used in Oklahoma:
"Right now we're considering a telecommunications reform bill in the
Senate that is trying to do something about por on the Internet - we
should do something about this terrorist information, too."'
Senator Dianne Femstem did attempt to do something about the
"terrorist information" on the Internet to which Senator Kennedy referred.
Feinstem proposed an amendment to the United States Code section
governing the importation, manufacture, distribution, and storage of
explosive materials.4 Although the amendment did not specifically refer
to the Internet, Feinstem clearly was motivated by her conception of the
"By the end of this school year, every school in California- 12,000
of them - will have access to the Internet and its vast world of
knowledge. By the end of this school year, fully 20 percent of Califor-
ma's classrooms will be connected for computers. I want to get
the children of America hooked on education through computers.
"Computers give us a world where people are judged not by the
color of their skin or their gender or their family's income, but by their
minds - how well they can express themselves on those screens. If we
can teach our children these values, they can learn to respect themselves
and each other. Then we can be certain we'll have stronger families,
stronger communities, and a stronger America in the 21st century."
The Future of the Net (visited Mar. 3, 1997) <http://www.cnet.com/Content/
Features/Dlife/Future/Visionanes/Interviews/int.clinton.html> (quoting Presi-
dent Clinton's speech).
40 Lawless: Too Many Loopholes in the Net?, ECONOMIST (visited Mar. 1,
1997) <http://www.economist.com/surveys/intemet/regulate.html>
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 842 (1994).
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Internet as a dangerous medium.42 Feinstein's position will be explained
more completely in Part fI.
41
II. RESTRICTING THE DISSEMINATION
OF VIOLENT OR DANGEROUS INFORMATION
A. Brandenburg v Ohio: Free Speech and Violence Generally
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,4 the Supreme Court interpreted the First
Amendment as protecting violent speech to the extent that such speech
was neither intended nor likely to provoke imminent lawless action.
Brandenburg was an active Ku Klux Klan member convicted under an
Ohio statute that cnmmalized the advocacy of violence as a means of
achieving political reform and also prohibited groups advocating political
violence from meeting.45 Brandenburg attended a Klan rally and gave
a brief speech while other Klan members, some of whom were armed,
circled a burning cross. 46 Brandenburg was filmed stating: "'We're not
a revengent orgamzation, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that
there might have to be some revengeance taken."' 47 This was the most
explicit statement Brandenburg made, and he did not incite any immedi-
ate violent action in response to his statements.
Quoting Noto v. United States the Court stated: "'the mere abstract
teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort
to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent
action and steeling it to such action.' ,48 The Court went on to declare
the Oino statute unconstitutional because it failed to distinguish between
speech that merely advocated violence and speech that fueled violence.
"A statute wich fails to draw this distinction impermssibly intrudes
upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments., 49 The methodology of Brandenburg is clear; it is necessary to
consider the nature of the speech, the intent of the speaker, and the
42 See rnfra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
4Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
41 See id. at 445.
46 See Id.
47 Id. at 446.
48 Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961))
(citations omitted).
49 id.
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context in which he or she is speaking. Brandenburg, therefore, establish-
es the rule for the regulation of dangerous speech: speech advocating
violence may be proscribed if it is intended to provoke imminent illegal
action that is likely to occur50 The question for this Note is whether the
publication of bomb-making instructions on the Internet is the sort of
dangerous speech that fails the Brandenburg test because of the inminent
danger of ensuing terrorism.
B. United States v Progressive, Inc.. Free Speech and National
Security Considerations
Factually, United States v. Progressive, Inc.5" bears a striking
resemblance to the question posed by this Note.52 That case arose
" See id. at 447 The intimacy and level of emotion exchanged between
parties in a face-to-face confrontation appear to be critical in satisfying the
requirementthat speechmust be intended to provoke imminment illegal action that
is likely to occur. In other words, incitement arguably requires an action
component that is possible only m a face-to-face communication. Although
commumcation via the Internet, even "real time" m a chat room, is arguably
more immediate than publication, such commumcation is fundamentally distinct
from face-to-face interaction.
Justice Douglas' concurrence further illustrates the distinction between
speech and action. According to Douglas, "[tihe line between what is permissible
and not subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to
regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts." Id. at 456 (Douglas J.,
concurring). Under Douglas' definition it is difficult to imagme how commumca-
tion over the Internet- that fundamentally lacks face-to-face interaction- could
ever be classified as action rather than speech.
s, United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
52 While the Progressive case is similar on the facts, its legal posture is
dramatically different from Brandenburg. Rather than seeking criminal
punishment for dangerous speech after the fact as in Brandenburg, the govern-
ment, in Progressive, sought to suppress dangerous speech in advance. In general,
in a prior restraint case such as Progressive, the burden on the government is
even heavier than in a case like Brandenburg. In addition to Progressive, New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curam) (the
Pentagon Papers case) is the other famous prior restraint case. While the
Progressive court was willing to enjoin the magazine's publication of H-bomb
plans, the Pentagon Papers Court refused to enjoin the publication of classified
materials relating to the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War.
The intricacies of prior restraint law are beyond the scope of flus Note;
however, it must be acknowledged that willingness to enjoin the publication of
10051996-97]
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because in 1979, ten years after Brandenburg, Howard Morland wrote an
article entitled The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It - Why We're Telling
It for publication in the Progressive.53 Morland culled information from
public sources for the article, intending to demystify the United States'
nuclear weapons program. As Progressive editor Erwin Knoll stated:
"Many people believed - and still believe - that there is an 'H-Bomb
secret' that can be written down on the back of an envelope (or in a
magazine article)." ' 4 According to Knoll, such a conception was
ridiculous. Morland's article attempted to demonstrate that the Umted
States' development of the bomb was such a monumental and expensive
project that only major governments were equipped for such an undertak-
ing."5 Morland also sought to prove that such a "secret" was in fact a
myth and "[t]he basics of nuclear fission, and in some cases the
"dangerous" material is quite different from the decision to punish an individual
for publishing that same information. For a discussion of prior restraint issues,
the Feinstein amendment, and bomb manuals on the Internet, see Eric B. Easton,
Closing the Barn Door After the Genie Is Out of the Bag: Recognizing a
"Futility Principle" in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 DEPAUL L. REV 1
(1995). Professor Easton considers such issues in terms of a "futility principle,"
which he describes by stating: "[T]he First Amendment imposes a presumption
against the suppression of speech when suppression would be futile. Suppression
is futile when the speech is available to the same audience through some other
medium or at some other place." Id. at 6.
Additionally, both the Progressive and the Pentagon Papers cases raise
issues concerning the source of "dangerous" information as grounds for
suppression, namely the misappropriation of government secrets and threats to
national security. The misappropriation and national security issues are not
addressed in this Note. In fact, given the publication of the Blaster's Handbook
(in which ammonium nitrate/fuel oil explosives are described) by the Department
of Agriculture, the government could not plausibly argue that bomb-making
instructions represent classified information or a threat to national security. See
The Availability of Bomb-Malang Information on the Internet: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 42 (1995), available m LEXIS,
Legis. Library, CNGTST File, Hearing on Mayhem Manuals and the Internet
[hereinafter Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony] (statement of Frank Tuerkheimer,
Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School; former United States Attorney).
" See Howard Morland, The H-Bomb Secret: How We Go It - Why We're
Telling It, PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 3.
" Erwin Knoll, The H-Bomb and The First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 705, 706 (1994).
51 See id.
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configuration of the bomb, were known to thousands of people around
the world and could be found in undergraduate physics texts, encyclope-
dias, and documents declassified long ago by the U.S. Government.,
56
Nevertheless, the Progressive was enjoined for "six months and mneteen
days" from publishing the article.57
Judge Robert W Warren, the federal judge who heard the Progres-
sive case, stated that "the question before this Court involves a clash
between allegedly vital security interests of the United States and the
competing constitutional doctrine against prior restraint in publication."58
The government asserted that, if published, Morland's article would likely
violate two sections of the Atomic Energy Act "prohibit[ing] anyone from
communicating, transmitting or disclosing any restricted data to any
person 'with reason to believe such data will be utilized to injure the
United States or to secure an advantage to any foreign nation."' 59 On
this basis, the government sought to enjoin the Progressive from
publishing Morland's article.
Judge Warren based his decision to grant the injunction on Near v.
Minnesota," in which the Supreme Court determined that prior restraint
was justified to restrict the commumcation of troop transport dates during
a time of war.6' Warren concluded that the publication of Morland's
article was analogous to such publication.62 According to Warren,
"[n]ow war by foot soldiers has been replaced in large part by war by
machines and bombs. No longer need there be any advance warning or
any preparation time before a nuclear war could be commenced."'63
In his evaluation of the national security and First Amendment values
at stake, Judge Warren's reasoning was motivated by his explicit concern
that the price for a mistake in the case could be fatal. Warren stated:
"The case at bar is so difficult precisely because the consequences of
error involve human life itself and on such an awesome scale." 6 It was
56 Id. at 706-07 (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 705.
5 1 Id. at 991.
59 Id. at 994 (quoting § 2274 of the Atomic Energy Act).
60 Near v Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
61 See Progressive, 467 F Supp. at 992 (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 716).
62 See id. at 996.
63 Id.
6 Id. at 995. Warren also wrote: "Faced with a stark choice between
upholding the right to continued life and the right to freedom of the press, most
jurists would have no difficulty in opting for the chance to continue to breathe
and function as they work to achieve perfect freedom of expression." Id.
1996-97] 1007
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also reported that Warren said he wanted "to think a long hard time
before [giving] a hydrogen bomb to Idi Amin."65 While he focused on
the drastic repercussions of a mistake in the case, Warren failed to
consider the lack of immediacy of the potential threat. As one commenta-
tor noted, "Warren must have understood the lack of immediacy, but he
did not respond."66
For several reasons the Progressive case does not answer the question
posed in this Note. First, the case involved the revelation of national
security information, arguably in violation of the Atomic Energy Act.
Second, the case revolved around prior restraint rather than puishment
after the fact. Third, Judge Warren misapplied Brandenburg by treating
the possibility of nuclear proliferation as a sufficiently imminent threat.
C. Rice v Paladin Enterprises, Inc.. Free Speech and Murder
Manuals
This Note asks whether the government could constitutionally
criminalize the posting of bomb-making instructions on the Internet on
the grounds that terrorists, or other criminals, might use those directions
to make a bomb. In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,67 a federal district
court considered whether a publisher, Paladin, could be held civilly liable
for a murder committed according to techniques described in the
publisher's books.68 Obviously, Paladin is similar to the question posed
by this Note, but the case does not resolve the basic dilemma: the
Paladin case involved a wrongful death suit brought by survivors of a
family murdered by an individual who had purchased two of Paladin's
books. While the case was civil rather than criminal, the court correctly
applied the Brandenburg test, concluded that Paladin was protected by the
First Amendment,69 and granted summary judgment in Paladin's
65 Knoll, supra note 54, at 706 (quoting Bill Peterson & Charles R.
Babcock, Magazine Barredfrom Publishing H-Bomb Article, WASH. POST, Mar.
10, 1979, at Al). "Idi Amm Dada led a revolt that ousted a civilian government
in Uganda in 1971. Between 1971 and his exile in 1979, Amm ordered the
deaths of thousands of Ugandans and expelled tens of thousands of Asians from
Uganda." Id. at 706 n.6 (citing Dictators: A Rogue's Gallery, L.A. TIMEs, Dec.
27, 1989, at A14).
66 L.A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. COLO. L. REv 55, 60
(1990).
67 Rice v Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996).
68 See id. at 838.
69 See id. at 848.
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favor.7" The facts of this case are tragic, bizarre, extreme, and particular-
ly relevant to this Note; therefore, they will be conveyed in detail.
In January 1992, James Perry responded to an advertisement and
purchased the books Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent
Contractors and How to Make a Disposable Silencer, Vol. II from
Paladin.7 At some point, Perry conspired with Lawrence Horn to
murder Horn's ex-wife and son.72 On March 3, 1993, Perry did murder
Horn's ex-wife, Horn's son, and the son's nurse by following Hit Man
to the letter.7' Perry used the specific rifle recommended by Hit Man;74
he altered the rifle, both before and after the murders, m the manner
described by the book;75 he followed instructions on how to construct
70 Id. at 849.
"' See id. at 838. In its catalog, Paladin described Rex Feral, the author of
Hit Man, as follows:
"Rex Feral kills for hire. Some consider him a criminal. Others
think hun a hero. In truth, he is a lethal weapon aimed at those he
hunts. He is a last recourse m these times when laws are so twisted that
justice goes unserved. He is a man who feels no twinge of guilt at doing
his job. He is a professional killer
"Learn how a pro gets assignments, creates a false identity, makes
a disposable silencer, leaves the scene without a trace, watches his mark
unobserved and more. Feral reveals how to get m, do the job and get
out without getting caught. For academic study only."
Id. (quoting Paladin's mail order catalog).
72 See id. at 839
3 See id.
74 See id. Hit Man recommends the AR-7"
"What other basic equipment will the beginner need as essential tools
of his trade? [an] AR-7 rifle. The AR-7 rifle is recommended
because it is both inexpensive and accurate. The barrel breaks down for
storage inside the stock with the clip. It is lightweight and easy to carry
or conceal when disassembled."
Id. (quoting REX FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS 21, 22 (1983)).
7. See Rice, 940 F Supp. at 839. Hit Man describes this procedure as
follows:
"The AR-7 has a serial number stamped on the case, just above the clip
port. This number should be completely drilled out. The hole left will
be unsightly but will not interfere with the working mechanism of the
gun or the clip feed. Use a rat-tail file, alter the gun barrel, the
shell chamber, the loading ramp, the firing pin and the ejector pin. Each
one of these items leaves its own definite mark and impression on the.
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a silencer;76 and he shot his victims three times in the eyes from a
distance of three feet, as recommended.
77
Although advertising that Hit Man was to be used "[flor academic
study only,""v Paladin conceded that criminals, in addition to individuals
seeking entertainment and education, were part of the intended audience
for its books. As the court noted:
Paladin engaged in a marketing strategy intended to attract and
assist criminals and would-be criminals who desire information and
instructions on how to commit crimes. In publishing, marketing,
advertising and distributing Hit Man and Silencers, Paladin intended and
had knowledge that their publications would be used, upon receipt, by
criminals and would-be criminals to plan and execute the crime of
murder for lure, in the manner set forth in the publications.7"
shell casing, which if any shells happened to be left behind, can be
matched up to the gun under a microscope in a police laboratory.
Of primary importance now too, is changing the rifling of the murder
weapon. This should be done even before you leave the crime scene.
That way, even if you get picked up or stopped with the weapon in
your possession, its ballistics will not match the bullets you left behind
in the mark."
Id. at 839-40 (quoting HIT MAN, supra note 74, at 23, 25, 105).
76 Id. at 839. Silencer instructions were written as follows:
"The directions and photographs that follow show in explicit detail how
to construct a silencer for a Ruger 10/22 rifle. The same directions can
be followed successfully to construct a silencer for any weapon, with
only the size of the drill rod used for alignment changed to fit the inside
dimension of the barrel."
Id. (quoting HIT MAN, supra note 74, at 39).
77 Id. Hit Man advises:
"Close kills are by far preferred to shots fired over a long distance. You
will need to know beyond any doubt that the desired result has been
achieved. When using a small caliber weapon like the 22, it is best to
shoot from a distance of three to six feet. You will not want to be at
point blank range to avoid having the victim's blood splatter you or
your clothing. At least three shots should be fired to insure quick and
sure death aim for the head - preferably the eye sockets if you are
a sharpshooter."
Id. (quoting HIT MAN, supra note 74, at 24).
78 Id. at 838 (quoting Paladin's mail order catalog). See supra note 71.
79 Rice, 940 F Supp. at 840.
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Despite the fact that Perry's actions closely followed the text of Hit Man
and that Paladin knew that criminals and would-be criminals would read
its books for instruction, the court granted summary judgment for
Paladin.80
The court concluded that Brandenburg set the appropriate standard
for consideration of the First Amendment issue and stated that the
Brandenburg standard "is not inherently limited to political speech
cases."'" Paladin's publication of Hit Man was protected for three
reasons: (1) Paladin's knowledge of the potential purchasers of its books
was irrelevant; (2) Paladin did not intend that imminent lawless activity
result from the purchase of its books; and (3) although Hit Man is
"morally repugnant, it does not constitute incitement or 'a call to
action."'8 2 "Nothing in the book says 'go out and commit murder nowl'
Instead, the book seems to say, in so many words, 'if you want to be a
hit man this is what you need to do.' This is advocacy, not incite-
ment.
83
Paladin was shielded from liability not only because its publication
was protected by the First Amendment, but also because Paladin was a
civil action for aiding and abetting wrongful death and Maryland does not
recogmze such a claim. 84 Had tls been an action based on the violation
of a criminal statute, the result possibly could have been different.
Otherwise, the case represents a particularly relevant application of
Brandenburg. Like Paladin, someone who posts bomb-making on the
Internet is not necessarily knowingly communicating with any particular
person or directly inciting specific acts. If lawless activity did result from
the posting of instructions, the intervening time required for the construc-
tion of a bomb would defeat any claim of imminence.
III. THE SENATE AND THE INTERNET
On May 11, 1995, one month after the Oklahoma City bombing, the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Govern-
ment Information held a hearing on "The Availability of Bomb-Making
Information on the Interet."85 Senator Arlen Specter, Chair of the
80 See id. at 849.
8! Id. at 846 (citations omitted).
82 Id. at 847 (citations omitted).
83 Id.
84 See id. at 842.
8' Capitol Hill Heanng Testimony, supra note 15.
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Subcommittee, described the purpose of the hearing as "[to focus] on the
use of the Internet by a variety of groups and individuals to propagate
'mayhem manuals,' which, as [their] name suggests, are guides to assist
people in committing acts of violence."86 After describing the physical
breadth of the Internet, Specter called it "a revolutionary form of mass
commumcation."87 Specter also emphasized that the Internet enables
people to communicate with a world-wide audience, without the
restrictions of editors, publishers, "time constraints,"88 or "the vagaries
of the market."89 Specter explicitly noted that "[a]mong those who
communicate on the Internet are purveyors of hate and violence."9 The
fact that information detailing the construction of explosives is available
on the Internet, "even [to] a 10-year-old child,"91 prompted Specter to
say that "I am troubled that we may one day fondly recall the days of
prank phone calls once these mayhem manuals permeate our schools." 92
Specter identified the issues as "the extent of [the use of the Internet
to disseminate information on explosives] and whether anything can or
should be done to curb it."93 According to Specter, if the government
attempted to regulate such speech on the Internet, two problems would
arise. First, Specter questioned "whether it is technologically feasible to
restrict access to the Internet or to censor certain messages., 94 If such
restriction is not technologically feasible, then "the government would
only be able to act after the fact to punish those who misuse the
Internet."95 Second, as Specter noted, free speech concerns would be
implicated by any governmental attempt to restrict or censor speech on
the Internet. Specter stated that Brandenburg provided the governing
standard on the issue, and he mentioned the Progressive case as a rare
instance where such speech had been successfully restricted.96
Specter's statements raise a number of questions. He repeatedly
described people who make bomb recipes available on the Internet as
"misus[ing] the Intemet" and implied that the government should either
86 Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)).
87 Id. (statement of Sen. Specter).
88 Id. (statement of Sen. Specter).
89 Id. (statement of Sen. Specter).
" Id. (statement of Sen. Specter).
9' Id. (statement of Sen. Specter).
92 Id. (statement of Sen. Specter).
93 Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Specter).
94 d. (statement of Sen. Specter).
9' Id. (statement of Sen. Specter).
9' See d. (statement of Sen. Specter).
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restrict, censor, or punish the publication of such recipes.97 However,
Specter also correctly asserted that Brandenburg was the governing
standard and stated that its holding was "that speech could not be
punished unless it was an incitement to iunment lawless action."98
Thus, Specter's position is unclear. His choice of examples99 implies
that he advocates restricting, censoring, or punishing the posting of bomb
recipes even when such speech is not intended to provoke imminent
illegal action that is likely to occur. Yet the legal test he acknowledges
would not allow any such limitations.
While Specter's intentions were somewhat unclear at the hearings,
Senator Femstem's were more obvious. Feinstein stated that "[she had]
a problem with people teaching others how to build bombs that kill."10
Feinstem was not persuaded by the fact that experts present at the
Subcommittee hearing suggested that most bomb recipes on the Internet
were protected by the First Amendment.' 1 Instead, Feinstein asserted
that "there is a difference between free speech and teaching someone to
kill [a]nd all we're doing here is protecting [terrorist information]
under the mantle of free speech."'0 2 Feinstem clearly had no tolerance
for the communication of bomb-making recipes in general, and the fact
that such information was available on the Internet increased her concern.
Femstem said "'t]his isn't a remote book hidden on the back shelf of a
9' See id. at 3-4 (statement of Sen. Specter).
98 Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Specter).
" Specter mentioned that The Big Book of Mischiefwas available on the
Internet. "This 93-page document details explosives formulas, how to purchase
explosives and propellants, and how to use them." Id. at 3 (statement of Sen.
Specter). However, Specter never stated whether this book encourages its readers
to use the recipes for illegal activities. Specter also noted that in the days
following the Oklahoma City bombing, there was a message in a newsgroup
mquiring if readers would like plans for a bomb like that used in Oklahoma City.
The anonymous poster also said that he or she could provide information to show
how the Oklahoma bomb could have been more effective. See id. (statement of
Sen. Specter). As Specter said, such a message is indeed disturbing and "[t]he
individual who posted this message deserves condemnation " Id.
(statement of Sen. Specter). However, it is not clear whether Specter would seek
to prosecute tlus individual or to censor his or her message. Furthermore, under
Brandenburg, such speech would surely be protected by the First Amendment.
"0 Brock N. Meeks, Internet as Terronst, CYBERWM DISPATCH (visited
May 11, 1995) <http://ohio.nver.org-omk/20/cwd05l1.html>
o' See infra notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
102 Meeks, supra note 100 (editorial comment in original).
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library that some physics student may find. It's going out on the internet
to anybody who might have access to it and might want to engage in a
terrorist act.' ,,,o3
Motivated by her desire to restrict the publication of bomb recipes on
the Internet, Feinstein proposed to amend the United States Code section
governing the importation, manufacture, distribution, and storage of
explosive materials.' 4 Feinstein's amendment would have made it a
felony "to teach or demonstrate the making of explosive materials, or to
distribute by any means information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the
manufacture of explosive materials, if the person intends or knows, that
such explosive materials or information will be used [to commit a
crime].""1 5 This amendment passed the Senate on June 7, 1995.106
Obviously, Feinstein believed that the Internet posed a unique threat
much more serious than a college library However, in her haste to
respond to an act of domestic terrorism, Feinstem ascribed undue weight
to a tangential issue (bomb recipes on the Internet) and created legislation
that ignored existing statutory law and Supreme Court precedent.
IV THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION Is BUT
ONE OF SEVERAL FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE
ATTEMPT TO RESTRICr VIOLENT OR DANGEROUS SPEECH
After noting that bomb recipes are regularly posted on the Internet
and that a number of organized hate groups use the Internet to commum-
cate, University of Chicago law professor Cass Sunstem considered
whether existing legal standards concerning violent speech should change
with emerging technology 107 Sunstem asserted that "[i]t is likely,
perhaps inevitable, that hateful and violent messages carried over the
airwaves and the Internet will someday, somewhere, be responsible for
acts of violence. Is that probability grounds for restricting
such speech?" ' Sunstein suggested that the Brandenburg test"0 9
seems to protect most speech on the Internet; however, he also suggested
103 Easton, supra note 15, at 45 (quoting Sen. Femstem in David Phinney,
Feinstein May Propose Criminal Penalty for Teaching Bomb Malang, STATES
NEws SERV., May 19, 1995).
"0 See 18 U.S.C. § 842 (1994).
'o' S. 735, 104th Cong. § 901 (1995).
106 See 141 CONG. REC. S7857, 7875 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
107 See Sunstem, supra note 21.
'o' Id. at 35.
109 See supra Part II.A (notes 44-50 and accompanying text).
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that Brandenburg may be inadequate m the case of speech that expressly
advocates the use of illegal violence."' According to Sunstem,
"Brandenburg made a great deal of sense for the somewhat vague speech
in question where relatively few people were in earshot.""'
However, with the Internet, potentially millions of people are in earshot
and Sunstein asserted that this fact alone changes "the calculus."
'" 2
Yet Sunstem was unwilling to suggest that Brandenburg is inadequate
for speech similar to bomb recipes. Instead, he switched the debate from
the audience to the message and drew a distinction between vague speech
and speech expressly advocating the use of illegal violence.' Vague
speech, in Sunstem's terms, is speech such as G. Gordon Liddy telling
millions of listeners in his radio audience how to shoot federal
agents." 4 Speech expressly advocating the use of illegal violence would
include a threat to kill the President." 5 Sunstem suggested that "restric-
tions be limited to express advocacy of unlawful killing because it is the
clearest case.
' 16
It is clear, at least for Sunstem, that while the potentially large
Internet audience might complicate the analysis, ultimately speech such
as the publication of bomb recipes would be protected. Furthermore, he
Ho See Sunstem, supra note 21, at 36.
I1 d.
"
2 Id. If changing the calculus means altering the Brandenburg formula, then
Sunstem errs somewhat m focusing on the size of the audience alone. While the
audience may grow, the intimacy decreases, thus reducing the likelihood and
imminence of illegal conduct. The loss of face-to-face contact also alters the
degree to which the speaker knows the likely effect of his or her words. In other
words, if the Internet changes the Brandenburg calculus, those changes argue
both for and against the puishment of dangerous speech.
'3 See id. at 36-37
114 See id. at 34. "Liddy explained how to shoot agents of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms: 'Head shots, head shots. Kill the sons of
bitches. Shoot twice to the belly and if that does not work, shoot to the groin
area."' Id.
".. See id. at 37 Sunstem also noted that "Congress has made it a crime to
threaten to assassinate the president, and the Court has cast no doubt on that
restriction of speech." Id. at 36-37 However, Liddy's statements are vague
enough that they "might receive protection insofar as they could be viewed as
unlikely to produce mimment illegality."Id. at 36. It is important to note that by
discussing a threat to the President, Sunstem again dramatically changes the
debate by moving into a particularly dangerous and lughly regulated form of
speech.
116 Id. at 37 Even express advocacy may fail the Brandenburg test, however.
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argues that the intent of the speaker and not merely the means of
communication, is an essential element to be considered when restricting
violent or dangerous speech. Unlike Senator Feinstein, a number of
experts who testified at the Senate Subcommittee hearings would also
agree. "1
7
Frank Tuerkheimer, a law professor who was the U.S. Attorney who
sought the injunction against the Progressive,"8 said that "our obliga-
tion to remain true to the basic values that characterize our system of
government and make it unique should not be weakened by the
horrors of the moment.""' 9 After discussing examples of both possibly
legal and illegal dissemination of bomb-making materials on the Internet,
Tuerkheimer suggested that any legislative response should focus on the
intent of the speaker. 20 Any other focus, such as Feinstein's fixation
on the medium itself, would be misplaced because such information is
already widely available in other media. 2'
Another witness, Jerry Berman," argued that there was less of a
connection between Internet speech and violence than between a street
"' See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
"8 Capitol Hill Heanng Testimony, supra note 15, at 4 (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter).
"9 Id. at 43 (statement of Frank Tuerkheimer).
'20 See id. at 44 (statement of Frank Tuerkheimer).
.21 For example, Tuerkheimer said:
Attached to this statement is a copy of pages 275-282 of Volume 21 of
the 1986 Encyclopedia Britannica. It reveals great detail on explosive
manufacture, similar in many respects to the information disseminated
electronically of concern to the Committee and others, including, on
page 279, a description of the Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel Oil mixture used
in the Oklahoma City bombing. Also attached is a list of books
containing similar information to the kind transmitted electronically.
The books on tins list were obtained from the Engineering and
Agriculture libraries at the University of Wisconsin in the one day
between the invitation to appear before this Committee and the
preparation of this statement and are generally available. Among these
books is a "Blasters Handbook" published by the Department of
Agriculture Forestry Service which in turn includes a description of the
Ammomum Nitrate/Fuel Oil explosive used in Oklahoma City along
with the recommended mixture of the two chemicals.
Id. at 44.
122 Jerry Berman is Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and
Technology, a public interest policy organization dedicated to the protection of
individual liberty in digital media. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Specter).
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demonstration and violence."2 ' "Words sent over the Internet may
inspire or incite, but the nexus between the words and subsequent action
is far more attenuated than any case in which the Court has approved
criminal sanction." '124 If this is true, then the publication of bomb
recipes on the Internet could not satisfy the Brandenburg requirement that
such speech must inspire imminent violence.'25
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert Litt also acknowledged
that not only were bomb recipes widely available on the Internet, but that
such materials have been available in bookstores and libraries for
years. 26 As Litt said, "most Americans, including those few inclined
to violence, understand that bombs can be made from commonly
available materials."' 27 Litt, when questioned by Specter, also asserted
that he did not think that the Department of Justice had "an ability to
assess, at this point, how many people get information off the Internet,
how many people get it from other sources."'28 Rather than focus on
the Internet itself, Litt suggested that under existing law, one could be
prosecuted for the dissemination of bomb recipes in certain circumstanc-
es. 12 9 For example, there is a federal statute that "specifically prohibits
demonstrating how to make an explosive device if one intends or knows
that it will be used in a civil disorder involving acts of violence affecting
interstate commerce."']3 Lit cited United States v. Featherston3' as
123 Id. (statement of Sen. Specter). "Unlike the crowded street in which
demonstrators circle a building, no matter how incendiary the words sent over
the Internet may be, they are still a long way from causing crmmal harm." Id.
at 37 (statement of Jerry Berman).
1
2 4 Id.
12S Id. (statement of Jerry Berman).
126 Id. at 16 (statement of Robert Litt).
127 Id. (statement of Robert Litt).
128 Id. at 47
129 Id. at 16 (statement of Robert Litt).
130 Capitol Hill Hearng Testimony, supra note 15, at 16 (statement of Robert
Litt). The statute Mr. Litt refers to is 18 U.S.C. § 231 (1994). Section 231(a),
(c) provides for fines or imprisonment for "teach[ing] or demonstrat[ing] the use,
application, or making of any firearm or explosive knowing or having reason
to know or intending that the same will be unlawfully employed for use in
a civil disorder "Id. § 231 (a).
13' United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). Featherston
was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 231 for giving "instructions at a meeting on
how to make and assemble explosive and incendiary devices in order to prepare
the attendees for 'the coming revolution."' Capitol Hill Heanng Testimony,
supra note 15, at 16 (statement of Robert Litt).
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an example of the successful application of this statute. However,
Featherston was convicted for giving a bomb-making presentation "to a
cohesive, organized group preparing for 'the coming revolution,' ready
to strike quickly, and including some members regularly trained in
explosives ,,132 Litt cited no case where an individual had been
punished for the abstract communication of bomb recipes m a context not
likely to mcite immnent violence because there is no such case. The
Progressive case 133 is the closest example; but Progressive is unique
because it involved the publication of information restricted by the
Atomic Energy Act at the height of the cold war.
Although the Feinstein amendment included a requirement that a
person teaching others how to make explosives intend that illegal activity
result from the teaching, the amendment itself is redundant given the
statute cited by Litt."' Such redundancy indicates that Femstem's
proposed amendment was the result of an emotional response to a
national tragedy combined with fear of a new technology Existing law,
particularly Brandenburg, makes it clear that the means by which
dangerous or violent speech is conveyed is but one of many elements to
be considered before such speech should be restricted. There are no
authorities to indicate that the test set forth in Brandenburg is not as
applicable to today's technology as it was to violent speech uttered to a
small group of people standing in a field.
CONCLUSION
The Internet is a unique communications medium because of its
ability to reach large audiences cheaply and without editorial interference.
Yet it is not unlike other mass media: users are merely transmitting
written words on a computer screen with no physical contact. Notwith-
standing the large number of potential Internet users, only Internet speech
that expressly advocates imminent specific acts of illegal violence should
possibly be restricted. The emotionally-charged environment of face-to-
face discussion is missing even from "real-time" communications among
Internet users. Thus, although directions for bomb-making posted on the
132 Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, supra note 15, at 16 (statement of Robert
Litt).
133 See supra Part II.B (notes 53-66 and accompanying text).
134 Id. at 16 (statement of Robert Litt). Both 18 U.S.C. § 231 and the
Feinstein Amendment make it a federal criminal offense to teach or demonstrate
to others how to make explosive devices, if that person intends or knows that the
information will be used in a federal crime (Femstem) or civil disorder (§ 231).
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Internet may indirectly motivate or induce terrorist behavior, the
connection between the speech and the ensuing acts is too remote to
allow criminal sanctions.
Clearly, when speech crosses the line from merely advocating
violence to fueling violence, in the Brandenburg sense, the speech
may be censored or punished. However, established solutions to
familiar problems should not be discarded merely because technology is
rapidly changing. Brandenburg effectively allowed the prohibition of
face-to-face commumcations intended to provoke imminent violence.'
35
In Paladin, Brandenburg was forcefully applied to published informa-
tion.3 6 Brandenburg thus provides a rational, effective, time-tested
standard that balances public and private security interests against
constitutional concerns for freedom of expression. Because Brandenburg
allows consideration of all the unique characteristics of the Internet, there
is no reason to formulate new jurisprudence merely because of new
technology
'.. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Seesupra Part II.A (notes 44-
50 and accompanying text).
136 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996). See supra
Part I.C (notes 67-84 and accompanying text).
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